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The Moon Mars Analog Mission Activities Mauna Kea 2012 (MMAMA 2012) field
campaign aimed to assess how effectively an integrated science and engineering rover
team operating on a 24-h planning cycle facilitates high-fidelity science products. The
science driver of this field campaign was to determine the origin of a glacially-derived
deposit: was the deposit the result of (1) glacial outwash from meltwater; or (2) the result
of an ice dam breach at the head of the valley?
Lessons learned from MMAMA 2012 science operations include: (1) current rover science
operations scenarios tested in this environment provide adequate data to yield accurate
derivative products such as geologic maps; (2) instrumentation should be selected based on
both engineering and science goals; and chosen during, rather than after, mission definition;
and (3) paralleling the tactical and strategic science processes provides significant efficiencies
that impact science return. The MER-model concept of operations utilized, in which rover
operators were sufficiently facile with science intent to alter traverse and sampling plans
during plan execution, increased science efficiency, gave the Science Backroom time to
develop mature hypotheses and science rationales, and partially alleviated the problem of
data flow being greater than the processing speed of the scientists.
& 2015 IAA. Published by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of IAA. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).n behalf of IAA. This is an o
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In reconnoitering remote regions, geologists utilize robotic
landers and vehicles to perform data acquisition and analysis.
Operations scenarios are designed, tested and refined for the
unique problems associated with conducting geology remo-
tely, for the abilities of the vehicles and landers in their
specific environments, and for the science goals of the
mission. This allows scientists to use these tools to efficiently
maximize science return. For example, Mars Exploration
Rovers (MER) science operations strategies were designedpen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Earth and Mars, a delay that required separating science-
driven decisions based on analysis of the surroundings, from
the actual execution of remote field activities [1–5]. A science
support team (the “science backroom”) determined science
priorities and observations to be executed by the rover the
following Martian day, or “sol”; these observations, along
with other necessary activities, were planned and executed
by the rover engineers. The science operations strategies for
Phoenix were developed from the MER operations blueprint,
but were initially planned to meet the dual constraints of a
landed (immobile) spacecraft and a known, finite lifetime for
mission activities [4]. In addition to the science team that
planned each sol's activities (the tactical team), the Phoenix
mission was to use a strategic science team to evaluate the
returned data and develop a plan for the next sols. The timing
of these two processes, tactical and strategic, was to be
planned so that the strategic team's input would be the basis
for the upcoming sol's plan.
Likewise, the strategies currently in use for the Mars
Science Laboratory (MSL) rover mission were created in
part by adopting salient parts of the MER and Phoenix
lander science operations architectures to meet the unique
constraints of MSL. These included the significantly larger
data stream acquired by the MSL rover compared to the
MER and Phoenix missions, the greater complexity in
operations due in part to the number and type of instru-
ments on-board, and the resultant additional tactical
(short-term) and strategic (longer-term) planning made
necessary by these factors. The MSL model requires a
complex interplay of strategic, tactical and supratactical
science and engineering processes to manage the demand
on resources, each of which must feed into and inform the
others. Ultimately, however, the 24-h latency between
planning and execution, and the integration and close
communication between the backroom scientists and the
spacecraft engineers regardless of their role in the tactical
or strategic process [6], remain key uniting factors in the
science operations of all three missions.
The science-driven operational strategies from these mis-
sions have been used to acquire data fromwhich products such
as geologic maps, compositional rock classifications, thermal
inertia maps, and stratigraphic cross-sections have been pro-
duced [7–9]. But the fidelity of these products cannot be fully
assessed without comparison to a known standard, which is
impossible for a truly remote location such as Mars or the
Moon. In lieu of comparing remotely-derived products such as
maps to a known standard, products derived from analog
activities conducted on Earth can be compared to those derived
from standard terrestrial techniques at the same location, to
determine the efficacy of those remote methods in acquiring
the necessary data to produce high-fidelity products. Mauna
Kea, Hawai'i, is a key site to carry out Moon and Mars analog
activities [10–13]. For the Moon Mars Analog Mission Activities
Mauna Kea 2012 (MMAMA 2012) field test, we compared
products and science results derived from field test rover
activities at a Mars analog site, with those produced by
geologists on the ground using traditional field techn-
iques. Our goal was to assess how effectively the science
operations strategy for an integrated team operating on a
24-h planning cycle facilitates data acquisition that yieldsaccurate, high-fidelity science products. The science objective
of this field campaign was to geologically map and determine
the origin of a glacially-derived deposit, with two potential
hypotheses to be tested: the deposit was the result of (1) glacial
outwash frommeltwater; or (2) the breach of an ice dam at the
head of the valley. This objective provided the parameters by
which success was measured (outlined in Section 4).
2. Geologic setting of ﬁeld site
The field campaign was conducted in a valley on the
southeast flank of the Mauna Kea volcano at an elevation
of 11,500 ft, in an area known locally and informally as
“Apollo Valley;” our study area lies across the access road
from the Mauna Kea Ice Age Natural Area Reserve [14]
(Fig. 1). Mauna Kea is composed of tholeiitic basalts from
an active shield stage, capped by relatively low silicate
alkali and transitional hawaiite basalts erupted relatively
slowly during a stage of postshield volcanism (e.g.,
[15,16]). The valley itself has been mapped as an unconso-
lidated gravel outwash deposit of subrounded to rounded
hawaiite and mugearite cobbles and boulders that is part
of the Pleistocene-aged Makanaka Glacial Member of the
Laupahoehoe Volcanics [16,17], a glaciation episode coin-
ciding with the late Wisconsin glaciation of North America
[18,19]. Bounding the valley on the upslope side is till of
that same glacial member. This broad ridge of till largely
plugs the relatively narrow span between the valley walls
here, with the exception of a ravine incised between it and
the western wall. At the end of the valley to the southeast,
and predating the glacial deposits, are several Pleistocene-
aged hawaiite/mugearite cinder cones. An extensive Pleis-
tocene hawaiite/mugearite flow unit forms the bedrock of
the valley sides and outcrops from below outwash depos-
its at the valley's southern end.
Attempts to date the advance and retreat of the Pleisto-
cene glaciers [20–22] have led to various interpretations of
the glacially-derived valley deposit. Pigati et al. [21] inter-
preted the valley deposit as a “boulder fan” and suggested,
based on boulder composition, that boulders were exca-
vated from the Younger Makanaka moraine currently plug-
ging the northern valley entrance, and transported a few
100 m downslope. They interpreted the valley deposit as
having formed over 3–4000 years as glacial meltwater
cut through and washed out portions of the moraines,
redepositing clastic material downstream in channels and
fans. However, Anslow et al. [22] calculated a bimodal
distribution of ages for boulders in the deposit, and
explained this discordance with the dates of Pigati et al.
[21] by observing that the fan is composed of unsorted
sediment with well-defined edges lying in a V-shaped gully
that eroded through the distal moraine to the east of Pu'u
Keonehinoe. They interpreted the deposit as having formed
by catastrophic drainage of a moraine-dammed lake, a one-
time event occurring around 12,000 years ago. Differences
in ages of the deposit calculated by the two works would
then be attributable to the temporal separation between
the glacial retreat and the ice-dam breach. Our focus in this
field campaign was to acquire data using a MER-type model
of science operations, and to use this data to determine
whether the valley deposit formed over time through
Fig. 1. (a) Location of Mauna Kea, on the Big Island of Hawai'i. (b) Mauna Kea, with field location shown in black box. (c) Region of field site with field site
boundaries shown in black box. Images downloaded from Google Earth. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.)
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moraine-dammed lake.
3. Field test
3.1. Preparations prior to the field test
Prior to field operations, orbital images of the valley
acquired from Google Earth were analyzed, and notional
traverses were created, mimicking the process in place to
plan traverses for MER and MSL. The orbital dataset served
as an analog to the orbital reconnaissance images that
would commonly be acquired prior to spacecraft landing,
and provided the initial information for the science team
to frame the hypotheses to be tested. Orbital images were
made available to the science team, but no other in situ
measurements at the field site were used for planning
notional stops for science observations. However, as for
MER and MSL, the Science Backroom was permitted to
alter the next day's traverse depending on the current
day's data. For the safety of the rover, the Rover Operations
Team was permitted to change the traverse based on
safety or traversability concerns. Rover traverses as exe-
cuted are shown in Fig. 2.
Traverses were planned primarily for rover safety and
traversability, and secondarily to meet science objectives.
Thus, paths were chosen that (1) were estimated to be
within the topography and roughness limits of rover
traversability; and (2) intersected locations that provided
high science return. The Day 1 traverse was designed to
primarily gather data on geomorphology and stratigraphy,
and included observations taken by the Ground-Penetrating
Radar (GPR); the traverse was planned so that depth
profiles were acquired across the widest point of the valley
deposit, to deconvolve the number and characteristics ofdepositional events represented. Day 2, in which the focus
was geochemistry, had fewer stops because sampling for
the MIMOS IIA (MIniaturized MÖssbauer Spectrometer)
instrument required more time than acquiring GPR data.
Because the highest priority for the MIMOS IIA team was to
characterize the variety of volcanic materials, the stops all
occurred at the terminus of the valley deposit, where the
unit bounds the local cinder cones. Because Day 3 data was
not needed for subsequent planning, observations were
designed to address issues raised during the previous two
days. Thus, the Day 3 traverse covers the most ground and
has the highest number of waypoints.
3.2. Instruments and rover
The MMAMA 2012 test utilized the JUNO II rover, a four-
wheeled rover with a U-shaped chassis that allows the rover
to accommodate a wide variety of payloads, and a geometric
suspension that averages the terrain to provide a reasonably
smooth ride while maintaining payload capacity. The JUNO II
has an active differential link that allows the rover to pitch
fore and aft in response to terrain or payload demands [23].
Mounted on the rover were instruments designed to support
rover situational awareness and science, including a panora-
mic video camera (Lucy), a magnetic susceptibility meter,
and a global positioning sensor receiver.
Additional instruments were chosen for the rover when
plans for the field campaign were already mature. Major
criteria in selecting science instruments for the field rover
included: 1) applicability to a general scientific investiga-
tion of the valley, 2) mobility, 3) availability, 4) remote
control capability, and 5) weatherproofing capability [24].
The instrument package was not chosen specifically to meet
the science goals of the field campaign, as these were defined
after instrument selection. The instruments included the
Fig. 2. Three days of rover traverses as executed by the Rover Operations Team. (A) Field area with locations of traverses on Day 1 (yellow), Day 2 (red) and
Day 3 (blue). (B) Day 1 traverse. (C) Day 2 traverse. (D) Day 3 traverse. GPR transects are shown as lines; camera panoramas were taken at squares; MIMOS
II samples were acquired at circles; VAPoR samples were acquired at diamonds.
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trument, a pyrolysis mass spectrometer [25] in an early stage
of development supported by a crusher/sieve apparatus
[14], a 400 MHz ground penetrating radar (GPR), and a sec-
ond- generation Mössbauer/X-ray fluorescence (XRF) spec-
trometer known as MIMOS IIA [26,27].
The Lucy camera was meant to be a primary science
instrument as well as an engineering instrument, but unlike
the other science instruments, this low-resolution camera was
not selected by the peer-review process, but by the engineer-
ing team. The choice was made during the period when the
field team expected to utilize the communications structures
set up for another test (discussed in Section 3.3). We thus
originally planned to transmit the data back to the science
room real time (hence the reason data volumewas a driver for
instrument selection). When the MMAMA field test lost most
of the expected communications support due to the split intest areas for the two field campaigns, the field team was
required to transfer data at the end of the day rather than real
time. This issue is expanded upon in Section 3.3.
3.3. Field test parameters
The field test was originally part of the two-week NASA
Regolith and Environment Science and Oxygen and Lunar
Volatile Extraction (RESOLVE) field test conducted at nearby
Pu'u Hawahine cinder cone (see ten Kate et al. [13] for a
description of that site), and was initially designed to be
conducted with a rover running real-time or near-real-time
operations. A “blind” science backroom was to plan rover
operations, analyze data continuously as it was acquired,
and feed results into tactical decisions made in real-time.
However, because the test was uncoupled from the parent
RESOLVE test late in the planning process, this necessitated
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accommodate a less reliable communications architecture.
The tactical timeline for this test was readjusted to run on a
24-h cycle: the data was acquired only once per day, rather
than continuously. The data acquired during the day was
analyzed by the science backroom in the evening, and used
by that team to inform and develop the next day's tactical
plan of traverse and observations.
The tactical science planning process as run adapted the
current MER and MSL science operations concepts to fit the
needs of the field campaign. On these two missions, the
science and engineering teams plan a full Martian day's
worth of activities (about 24 h, or one “sol”) based on data
downlinked, reduced and refined from the previous sol's
plan by scientists serving as payload downlink leads (PDLs).
The next sol's plan of activities is created through discus-
sion, debate and consensus, by a rotating team of scientists
and engineers called the Science Operations Working Group
(SOWG) headed by a scientist in the role of SOWG Chair.
Science priorities are determined and science goals are
weighed against engineering constraints and needs (for
example, data rate, available power, acquisition of data
critical for decision-making in future sols). The result is
a set of rover and instrument activities that maximizes
science return within the parameters of the environment
and the limitations of the mission architecture.
The crucial roles of the MER/MSL model that informed
our science operations scenario were that of the PDLs,
SOWG, and SOWG Chair. The Instrument Leads, who were
responsible for both their instrument and their instru-
ment's science investigation, served as PDLs and were part
of the Field Team. These team members (all with geology
backgrounds) were an important component in reducing
the data into manageable bits for the Science Backroom to
ingest rapidly enough to make daily tactical decisions
[28,29], as well as ensuring that science intent was trans-
mitted accurately to the engineers in the field. All partici-
pants with geological and similar backgrounds comprised
the Science Backroom (mimicking the SOWG), while the
Science Lead of the field test served in the role of the SOWG
Chair. These roles are noted in Table 1; the roles of the Field
Operations, Science and Integration Lead (FOSIL) and the
Field Team have no close analog in MER/MSL experience
and will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.4Table 1
List of field test roles and responsibilities.
Operations role Key responsibilities
Instrument Lead Refine the day's data from each instrument
Backroom.
Field Operations, Science, and
Integration Lead (FOSIL)
Facilitate integration of rover operations an
Field Team (comprised of
Instrument Leads and the
FOSIL)
Monitor the plan as it executes; ensure scie
light of engineering challenges; adjust plan
opportunistic discoveries in near real-time.
Rover Operations Team Execute the plan; operate the rover
Science Backroom (includes Field
Team members)
Determine science activities (traverse, obse
acquired during the day.
Science Lead Lead the Tactical Science Backroom; feed sc
Field Team; ensure science activities map b
testable hypotheses.3.4. Field test activities
A full day of operations began with the Field and Rover
Operations Teams executing the day's planned field activ-
ities. Near the end of field operations for the day, while the
rover was powered down by the Rover Operations Team,
the Field Team returned to team lodgings and assisted the
Instrument Leads in reducing and refining the instrument
data acquired that day. Each Instrument Lead produced a
report for their instrument, noting the data planned com-
pared to the data acquired, any problems with the instru-
ment or the data processing, and a high-level summary of
important science results, especially those potentially deci-
sional for sampling, traverse or observation planning. The
rover operators also reported on the health of the rover, and
whether there were any constraints or limitations placed on
science planning from an engineering perspective. Armed
with this understanding of the parameters and constraints,
science discussion followed among the Science Backroom,
focusing on the science goals and testable hypotheses laid
out before the field test. The Instrument Leads assessed
collected samples, and the Science Backroom determined
the next day's instrument activities and observations,
including any additional sample acquisition. This plan was
relayed to the Field Team for the next day's activities. The
daily timeline is shown in Table 2.
This field test was originally planned for two weeks, but
was shortened to only three days of rover operations when
it was uncoupled from the RESOLVE activities. To accom-
modate this collapsed timeline, and given the lack of
reliable communications between the tactical Science
Backroom and the Field Team, a change in the MER/MSL
model was adopted. It was decided not to stop the rover's
activities in the field when challenging terrain forced a
change in the traverse or science plan, as would occur in a
remote situation. Instead, the Science Backroom created
both the next day's traverse plan based on the current
day's data, and a number of alternate traverses and sam-
pling targets, to be implemented in the event of unforeseen
problems with the hardware or terrain. These alternate
traverses were designed based on a well-articulated
science intent and resulting set of priorities that were
communicated to the Field Team. Thus, in cases where the
original traverse would mean downtime for the rover, theMER/MSL-like role
and distill important results to the Science PDL
d science instrument operations No equivalent
nce intent is followed as far as possible in
to mitigate problems and take advantage of
No equivalent
Engineering team
rvations, sampling) based on science data Science Operations
Working Group (SOWG)
ience intent for next day's activities to the
ack to science and sampling goals and
SOWG Chair
Table 2
Timeline for science backroom operations.
Time Activity Responsible party
8 a.m.–5 p.m. Data acquisition, rover activities Field Team (Rover Team and Instrument
Leads)
2 p.m.–6 p.m. Data reduction/refinement and preparation of reports Instrument Leads
6 p.m.–7 p.m. Break/Food All
7 p.m.–8:30 p.m. Data reports, review of traverse, summary of engineering constraints for next
day's plan
Instrument Leads, Rover Lead
8:30 p.m.–10:30 p.m. Science discussion; create plan for following day Science Backroom led by Science Lead
10:30 p.m.–11 p.m. Upload plan; brief Field Team on science intent. Science Backroom led by Science Lead
MER Hawaii
Long-term
Daily
Real-time
science 
discussion
Long-term goals
      plan of 
observations
Long-term goals
(given at outset)
science 
discussionresults
real-time
rovingresults
      plan of 
observations
Fig. 3. Simplified information flow diagram comparing this MMAMA
field test on the right to MER operations on the left.
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informed decisions to alter the plan that were true to the
intent of the original plan decided on during the last cycle (i.
e. the night before). The Field Team was also empowered to
maximize rover data acquisition time by choosing alternate
sampling targets based on the science intent. For example, if
the highest priority target was not reachable with the rover,
the Field Team could choose to sample a different target
that was not called out by the Science Backroom, but served
the original science intent, and which would have been seen
in images with resolutions more typical of current and
previous Mars missions (sub-mm at 1.5 m distances). Thus,
intervention by the Field Team was limited only to situa-
tions where following the traverse planned by the Science
Backroom would result in a dangerous or untenable situa-
tion for the rover or other hardware. They intervened not to
make science decisions, but to make required engineering
decisions that followed the intent of the Science Backroom.
The empowerment of the Field Team to make such deci-
sions allowed us to return to a modified near real-time
operational mode. A simplified graphic of information flow
for MER and this test is shown in Fig. 3.
4. Assessing outcomes
This test was designed to measure the success of science
outcomes, and because science outcomes are discovery-
driven, there is no hard and fast rule for judging success.
Instead, to qualitatively determine the efficacy of the tested
operational strategy, we have utilized a rating system, such
that if the metric was fully achieved, the metric receives a
“yes” and if it is not fully achieved, the rating given is “no”.
In one case there is insufficient data to come to a conclusion.
A more detailed explanation of the reasoning for each rating
is also given. This information is summarized in Table 3.
5. Discussion
Significant findings based on science operations con-
ducted for this field test involve (1) science data product
generation and interpretation; (2) instrumentation; and
(3) science decision-making on the tactical timeline.
5.1. Data product generation and interpretation
The Science Backroom generated a geologic map based
on the compilation of all available rover data (Fig. 4), and
they utilized this map to assess hypotheses of deposit origin.The resulting map provides greater detail than previously
available geologic maps of the area [16] and was sufficient to
drive progress towards a discrimination of competing
hypotheses, though the rover's instrument package did not
provide data that would allow full confidence in results. The
Science Backroom divided the valley deposit into an exten-
sive outwash plain with headwaters emanating from the
west portion of the valley, and an eastern flood deposit
resulting from the breach of an ice dam, extending partway
into the valley. The boundaries and interpretation of the
nature of the flood deposit were based primarily on the
location of poorly-sorted finer-grained material, and the
presence of large cobbles and boulders ponded behind
kipukas, suggesting a flow velocity greater than would
normally be expected for a common glacial outwash channel
carrying only sand and gravel. This hypothesis is also
consistent with the deposit age estimates of both Anslow
et al. [22] and Pigati et al. [21]. The Science Backroom also
noted that the western deposit might be younger based on
superposition relationships, although this relationship was
not unambiguous based on rover imaging data alone.
GPR subsurface data revealed several potential reflecting
surfaces, one at 1 m depth, and less coherent ones down
to 3 m depth (although some may be multiple reflections
of the surface). The 1 m reflector displays troughs and
dipping reflectors in GPR transects taken perpendicularly
across the western part of the valley, but only horizontal
to sub-horizontal reflectors in transects taken running
longitudinally down the valley (Fig. 5). These reflectors are
flat and smooth at the scale of 30–40 cm (approximate
radar wavelength in the gravel), indicating that the surface
they represent must be also, with any roughness or
Table 3
Assessment of science outcomes for remotely acquired data only.
Metric Rating Comments
Was the data acquired using the planned operational strategy
sufficient to inform tactical science decisions?
Yes Reasonableness and efficacy of science decisions made by Science
Backroom were confirmed by follow-on in-situ assessment of site
by geologists.
Was the data acquired using the planned operational strategy
sufficient to assess presented hypotheses?
Yes Method provided sufficient flexibility to acquire the necessary data
had the instrumentation been available to provide it.
Was the data acquired using the planned operational strategy
appropriate to inform tactical science decisions?
No GPR characterization of subsurface layers was key, but resolution of
Lucy camera was not optimal and not of sufficient quality to
address science objectives; grain-scale resolution required but
unavailable.
Was the data acquired using the planned operational strategy
appropriate to assess presented hypotheses?
Insufficient
data
Data types acquired (e.g. image mosaics in conjunction with sample
measurements) were likely appropriate but the actual data
acquired was not. Cannot determine usefulness of compositional
data without high-resolution context imaging.
Was the data acquired using the planned operational strategy
ultimately sufficient and appropriate to discriminate between
presented hypotheses?
No Science Backroom favored the hypothesis confirmed by follow-on
in-situ geologists, but could not commit strongly to it based on
evidence available through rover activities only.
R.A. Yingst et al. / Acta Astronautica 113 (2015) 120–131126included materials being smaller than this diameter. One
interpretation of these signals is that there are multiple
overlapping or adjacent elongate tongues of material with a
downslope flow direction under the western valley deposit;
the separate tongues are seen in cross-section by the GPR
when it executes a transect perpendicular to the valley.
Another potential interpretation is that the reflectors repre-
sent smooth or gently undulating lava flows (or flat
pavement-like surfaces composed of decimeter-scale frag-
ments of lava as observed on adjacent terrains) that predate
glacial activity. The troughs and dipping reflectors would
then represent boulders greater than 1 m diameter that
are part of, or rafted on, that flow. However, based on
transects taken next to outcrops of lava bedrock, solid lava
has a different characteristic signal and dives to depths
43 m. In the first scenario, the valley fill deposits would be
significantly thicker than in the second, in which case they
may only be 1 m deep in places. The nature of the layers
could be better constrained over the entire area with a test
pit, though this was beyond the scope of the field campaign
work. In any case, there was a notable absence of
hyperbolic-like point reflectors, suggesting that the occur-
rence of boulders 430 cm, which are common at the
surface of the eastern unit, is rare within the deposit of
the western unit. If the multiple-tongues interpretation of
the data is correct, it would suggest that the western valley
had a minimum of two depositional events, though the
timing of those depositional events cannot be determined
from the GPR data. The dataset provided by the rover's
other instruments was not such that the team could further
explore the veracity of this interpretation.
In short, this field test demonstrated operational suc-
cess by showing that the current MER-type operations
scenario provides sufficient and appropriate remotely-
acquired data to be able to address certain types of science
questions and produce reasonable geologic maps. The map
in Fig. 4 shows one of the scientific outcomes of these
operations. However, even though operationally the
necessary data could have been acquired to provide
further detail on the origin of the glacially-derived deposit,
with respect to the two hypotheses to be tested, the
dataset provided by the instrument package was not of anature that allowed the team to definitively confirm either
one of these hypotheses. The tension point was the
instrument package used, rather than the operations
strategies.
5.2. Instrumentation
Instrumentation drives the type and quality of science-
related data that can be acquired. Instruments are ideally
chosen to perform the tasks needed to meet both engi-
neering and science goals; however, for this field campaign
the instrument package was chosen prior to science goal
definition. In practice, the remote instruments (the GPR
and Lucy camera) were utilized as tactical instruments,
informing the science decisions made for the next day's
planning, while the sampling instruments could only
inform strategic decisions. Thus, we focus assessment on
the choice of remote instruments, which was consequen-
tial to tactical science decisions.
The GPR provided data that was especially useful in
deconvolving site history. Specifically, because the GPR was
able to resolve layers at depth, the presence, thickness and
topography of subsurface units could be estimated. These
data were key factors in building reasonable interpretations
of the site's geologic history. In addition, the video capability
of the Lucy camera allowed the Science Backroom in some
instances to capture the exact location where the rover
crossed unit boundaries, as the camera was able to image
coarse changes in morphology (e.g., Fig. 6).
However, the Lucy camera did not have the resolution,
focusing, mosaicking and other capabilities needed to address
the stated science goals of this test. Specifically, the morphol-
ogy and distribution of clasts less than 20–30 cm diameter
(cobbles and boulders) could not be resolved. Within this size
range is recorded the abrupt change in rounding of the
abundant cobbles and boulders from the eastern to the
western sections of the upper valley, a relationship easily
visible in the still images taken by the Field Team's hand-held
cameras, and diagnostic of a difference in transport mechan-
isms responsible for these two units. Additionally, the camera
meant to resolve grain-scale morphology and relationships
(i.e. a handlens-type imager similar to the MER Microscopic
Fig. 4. Geologic map of the field site with description of material units. Satellite image of map area shown in inset is the area in the blue box in Fig. 1.
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properly in the field, and thus lithologic data was never
available to the Science Backroom. The result was that geologic
unit boundaries that might have been identified by mapping
the presence and abundance of fine-grained (0.1–1mm dia-
meter) material were invisible to the rover.
5.3. Science decision-making on the tactical timeline
The change in the field campaign timeline necessitated
significant alterations in the length and execution of the
tactical process. The operations scenario finally settled upon
was one in which some real-time decisions were made on the
ground by the Field Team, informed by the science intentstated during planning. Without this change, reconnaissance
of the site within the time limit of the field campaign would
have been impossible. Additionally, this model increased
efficiency significantly, by eliminating rover downtime due to
engineering or communications issues. Based on the current
MER and MSL science operations activities, this model saved a
minimum of 1–3 sols worth of science activities every time a
problem of this type occurred in the field.
The Field Team essentially ran in real-time, a scenario
that has not been attempted on Mars, as the travel time for
communications imposes a latency of at least 40 min at the
most favorable orbital positions. This is comparable to the
Apollo and Lunakhod architectures, and to some prior lunar-
model field tests (e.g., [30] and 〈http://astrogeology.usgs.
Fig. 5. GPR data acquired on Day 3. (a) Transect acquired perpendicular to downvalley direction. Note reflector at 1 m depth (blue arrow); reflecting
surfaces are traced in yellow. (b) Transect acquired parallel to downvalley direction. Note straight reflectors at 1 m and 3 m depth (blue arrows);
reflectors are traced in yellow. (Inset) Location of transects (a) and (b). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 6. Hand-held camera image of boundary between Older Flow unit (left of
yellow line) and Outwash unit (right of yellow line). Fragments of the under-
lying lava flow are angular to very angular, with higher vesicularity (examples
indicated by green arrows), while fluvially-altered clasts transported in glacial
meltwater channels aremore rounded and the population has fewer vesiculated
fragments (blue arrows). (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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broader concept of operations, in which rover operators
were sufficiently facile with science intent to alter traverse
and sampling plans during plan execution, took advantage
of the concept of dividing the tactical and strategic science
teams, as modeled by Phoenix and MSL operations [4,6].
This increased the efficiency by which science was con-
ducted. Such a model also applied the lessons learned
during previous analog tests [29,31], by giving the Science
Backroom time to develop mature hypotheses and sciencerationales, and choose optimal sampling sites and traverses
to address them, while a well-informed tactical team con-
ducted the actual data acquisition. Additionally, our concept
partially alleviated the problem of data flow being greater
than the processing speed of the scientists [29], by requiring
the Field Team to give daily reports directly to the Science
Backroom, while memories were fresh. Science Backroom
team members could ask questions, get clarification, and
then move on to the decision-making process when they
felt that they understood the data and the engineering
situation in full. In this way, we expanded on the MER
model of PDLs providing reports of the previous sol's data at
the SOWG meeting (we must also note that the amount of
data acquired was significantly greater for tests where
humans were used to acquire the data rather than a rover
[28]; thus the problem of data ingestion was necessarily
more severe in such tests than here).
The Field Team's ability to intervene when necessary was
a change made to our operations out of immediate necessity.
As such, we were unable to set the quantitative constraints
around this parameter that would allow us to document
rigorously individual interventions by the Field Team in the
tactical process. However, we note that on Mars, often sols
must be spent to reassess terrain or targets based on safety,
reachability or traversability concerns, and in such cases the
tactical Science Backroom's expertise is only needed to
confirm that the science intent is being carried forward.
Such changes in the plan, then, are not a result of the science
process failing. For this test, in almost all cases where the
Field Team changed the traverse, it was for traversability or
safety reasons. Changes more salient to this analysis occurred
on Day 2, where the original sampling-heavy traverse was
changed because the sample targets were not reachable;
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Backroom were acquired. In one case where even that was
not possible, the Field Team chose a tertiary target that
matched the unit the Science Backroom was attempting to
sample. In this case as well, the Science Backroom intent was
carried out rather than over-ruled.6. Lessons learned
Lessons learned from this field campaign emphasize
the following common themes: (1) current rover science
operations scenarios tested in this environment provide
adequate data to yield accurate derivative products such as
geologic maps; (2) instrumentation should be selected
based on both engineering and science goals; and (3)
paralleling the tactical and strategic science processes
provides significant efficiencies that impact science return.
We expand upon each of these themes below.(1) Although the instrumentation was not optimized for the
science goals and the science operations scenario was
compromised early in the planning stage, the Science
Backroom ran smoothly, acquired some robust data, and
was able to produce a geologic map that informed the
given hypotheses positively. The key factor of the MER/
MSL-based science operations scenario that alleviated
the crush of data flow to the Science Backroom was the
set of reports given by all Instrument Leads, thereby
efficiently summarizing for the scientists the necessary
and important facts for them to make tactical decisions.
We believe this systemworked significantly better in this
test than prior tests (e.g., Desert RATS [28,29]), because
our data volume was much less than a human-driven
mission would produce. Thus, for rover-only missions (i.
e. those without in situ humans), the test demonstrated
that the science operations approach tested here is such
that the resulting data products are high-fidelity. How-
ever, the level of certainty regarding conclusions made
solely based on rover-acquired data was not high, and
we believe that to a large extent this was due to the
instrumentation, specifically the lack of high-resolution
imagery and the VAPoR/MESH instrument being in a too
early phase of development (as noted in Section 3.2).(2) The very low resolution of the Lucy camera, chosen
when the communications structure allowed real-time
communication but low data volume, greatly hampered
the ability of the Science Backroom to produce a reason-
able geomorphologic analysis within the mission time-
line. It is, in fact, uncertain whether the data sets
acquired will ever be sufficient for this purpose. As noted
in Section 5.2, Lucy did not have high enough resolution
(by a factor of 10) to provide any but the most basic clast
morphology, a crucial data point in discriminating
between transport processes. Lucy's resolution was diffi-
cult to assess in a quantitative sense regardless, because
the only data available to the Science Backroom was in
moving 3601 panoramas that immediately went out of
focus once the camera completed the pan. Stills could
only be acquired by pausing the pan mid-process and
capturing a screen shot. Best qualitative estimates ofresolutionwere 10 cm for an object of contrasting albedo
to be detected and its gross shape resolved (elongate vs.
equant) if it was within 1.5 m of the rover. Effective
resolution was closer to 20–30 cm since most features
were of similar albedo. Resolution decreased rapidly
with distance and distance from the rover could not be
measured tactically, only guessed by the Field Team.
Attaining and retaining situational awareness, and pro-
viding scientific context, each require different imaging
capabilities. This need is one reason why the MER and
MSL rovers were equipped with hazard avoidance and
navigational cameras for engineering needs, and a
panoramic imaging system with a suite of spectroscopic
filters chosen for geologic and atmospheric assessment.
The science goals of this field campaign would have
required the integration of a higher-resolution imager
into the rover system than was used for situational
awareness. Future simulations must give more thought
to including on the payload an imager or set of imagers
that are designed to fully document the local morphol-
ogy of the site and the samples acquired. In a more
general sense, however, to ensure that chosen instru-
ments meet the needs of science and engineering
combined, both groups should be fully integrated in all
planning stages to ensure optimal science output.(3) The change in the operations structure to one in which
rover operators were sufficiently facile with science intent
to alter traverse and sampling plans during plan execution
allowed for maximum rover usage and data acquisition
time, while avoiding overwhelming either the Science
Backroom or the Field Team. When engineering issues of
safety, reachability or traversability occur on Mars, addi-
tional sols are added to the long-term operations plan to
provide the engineers time to follow the intent of the
Science Backroom by finding another path, or a reachable
target roughly equivalent to an unreachable one. In the
case of this fieldwork, we stipulated to the lost sols,
estimated howmany sols might have needed to be added
to recover, and continued the operations sequence; the
result was not a change in the way science decisions were
made, but in the speed with which they were carried out
on the ground. Based on the reports of the Field Team for
each day, the Field Team intervened in the tactical plan for
engineering issues a number of times. We estimate that
the activities in this field test, if executed on Mars, would
have added approximately 2–10 sols to the campaign
length, depending on the nature of the terrain. This
estimate includes planning cycles for engineers to acquire
additional imaging, assess alternate paths for safety and
traversability, and approach and attempt the alternate
path. However, because these were engineering problems
(even on Day 2, when the greatest number of plan
changes were made), the number of sols that would need
to be added to the planning cycle for the Science Back-
room to reassess was zero.This model of a Science Backroom and a Field Team has
potential implications for the use of humans-in-the-loop in a
variety of rover mission scenarios. However, this test was an ad-
hoc solution to an immediate problem, not a high-fidelity test.
The decisions of the “on-the-ground” scientists were informed
gical Sciences from Brown University.
R.A. Yingst et al. / Acta Astronautica 113 (2015) 120–131130by their in situ knowledge of the field site, for example; in a real
remote rover mission, these scientists would be limited in their
decisions by the data acquired by the rover. Thus, it is not clear
how much benefit humans-in-the-loop would be if those
humans were not actually standing in the field. A rigorous test
is needed of this promising operations scenario, to ensure that
other variables can be eliminated or lessened, and the potential
benefits in lessening rover downtime and increasing the ability
of scientists to ingest and use data as it is acquired, can be
assessed.
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